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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST^TE OF UTAH 
— — J 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, t Case No. 880066 
v. : 
ALFRED WILLIAM J. JOHNSON, : Categoty No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of Burglary, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1978), 
and Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978). This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 7)8-2-2 (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the evidence introduced at trial was 
sufficient to support the denial of defendant's motion to dismiss 
and to support the jury's guilty verdict. 
2. Whether the trial court's inadvertent mention to 
the jury of two charges in the charging document prejudiced 
defendant's right to a fair trial on the burglary charge. 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when 
it sentenced defendant to consecutive term$ for Burglary and 
Habitual Criminal convictions. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The statute relied on in the argument of this case is 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978). The text of this statute is: 
Any person who has been twice convictedr 
.sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree or a 
crime which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with Burglary, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1973), and 
with Habitual Criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1978). 
Defendant was tried to a jury on the Burglary charge on 
December 10, 1987 in the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable Richard H. Moffat, presiding. The jury convicted 
defendant and then the Court took evidence of defendant's prior 
convictions and found defendant guilty of the Habitual Criminal 
charge. 
On January 15, 1988 the Court sentenced defendant to 
serve one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for Burglary 
and five years to life for Habitual Criminal, both sentences to 
run consecutively to each other. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 1987, John and Eleanor Sargent left 
their apartment on Second Avenue in Salt L^ke City to go to lunch 
(R. 94 at 19). As they left, Mrs. Sargent locked the door by 
pushing in the button in the middle of the door knob (R. 94 at 20 
and 46). Mr. Sargent pulled the locked door shut (R. 94 at 20) 
and-Mrs. Sargent recalls him "rattl[ing] it a bit" (R. 94 at 47), 
Mr. Sargent testified that they had never had any problem with 
the door "falling open" (R. 94 at 20). 
After having lunch and dropping his wife off at the 
University of Utah, Mr. Sargent returned to find the door of his 
apartment open about one inch (R. 94 at 22). As he opened the 
door he saw defendant standing in the livirkg room just at the 
entrance to the bedroom (R. 94 at 23). Mr. Sargent challenged 
defendant who responded that he was looking for someone else, 
that it was a mistake and that he hadn't taken anything. He then 
asked Mr. Sargent to check and see that nothing was missing (R. 
94 at 23). Defendant said all of that at once then added that he 
was looking for a friend, Steve Goddard (R. 94 at 23-24). No one 
by that name lived in the building where the Sargents' apartment 
was (R. 94 at 24). Mr. Sargent was confused and fearful of a 
confrontation with defendant and began checking to see if 
anything was missing (R. 94 at 24-25). 
On searching, Mr. Sargent found iittle out of place but 
did notice that his wife's jewelry box on the window sill was 
open with nothing missing; he said that there was nothing of 
great value in the box (R. 94 at 26). He 6aid he had not seen 
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the lid open before he left for lunch and that their common 
practice was to keep the lid shut (R. 94 at 27). 
Mrs. Sargent testified that she had not opened the 
jewelry box for a year and that it had a thick coat of dust 
-because it hadn't been touched for so long" (R. 94 at 48). She 
noticed when she returned to the apartment on September 29th that 
the lid was open and could see the coat of dust on it still (R. 
94 at 49). She also noticed "a couple of fingerprints on it" (R. 
94 at 49). She said that they looked like fingerprints but 
admitted she had no training in identifying fingerprints (R. 94 
at 49-50). The marks in the dust were "[l]ittle, round spots in 
the dust that appear as though they might be fingerprints" (R. 94 
at 50). Officers were unable to lift any prints because the 
surface of the box was not conducive to obtaining prints (R. 94 
at 55). 
After checking the apartment and finding nothing 
missing, Mr. Sargent went back into the living room and spoke 
with defendant (R. 94 at 28). Defendant told Mr. Sargent his 
name was "Alf" (R. 94 at 30). 
After defendant left, Mr. Sargent thought about the 
occurrence and finally came to the decision that he "probably had 
entered a burglary in progress " (R. 94 at 29). He then called 
the police (R. 94 at 29-30). 
The police later presented a photo line-up to Mr. 
Sargent and he identified the defendant's photo as being the 
person in his apartment (R. 94 at 31 and 56). He also identified 
defendant at trial as being the person (R. 94 at 32). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A defendant's intent must be inferred from the facts 
and evidence elicited at trial because intent is not susceptible 
to direct proof. If there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, which supports the jury's finding that the defendant 
had the requisite intent to commit theft, the appellate court 
should affirm the jury's verdict. Enough evidence was presented 
at trial to support the jury's verdict in this case. 
The trial court's inadvertent mention of two charges in 
this case, without more, was harmless error and this Court should 
not overturn the jury's verdict on such a technicality. 
The consecutive terms imposed in this case for Burglary 
and Habitual Criminal is a proper enhancement for a persistent 
offender and does not violate double jeopardy standards. 
Defendant is being punished for committing ^n additional felony, 
not for the previous criminal acts. Running the two prison terms 
consecutively is a proper enhancement for continued criminal 
activities by this defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial to support his conviction. A review 
of the evidence, however, reveals that defendant's claim is 
without merit. 
-«u 
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in State v. Booker, 
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that where a defendant claims the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the standard 
of review is narrow. 
"[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State 
v. Petree, Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); 
accord State v. McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 
942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the 
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. "It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. . . . " State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 
P.2d 229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . . 
Id. at 345 (emphasis in original). 
Defendant maintains that the jury could not have found 
that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit a theft 
based on the evidence introduced at trial. As this Court said in 
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985): 
Defendant's argument is based only on his 
interpretation of the evidence, which is not 
the only reasonable interpretation. A 
contradictory version of the facts, without 
more, is not a ground for reversal. State v. 
Buel, Utah, 700 P.2d 701 (1985). . . . We 
assume that the jury chose to believe the 
evidence that supports the verdict. State v. 
Carlson, Utah 635 P.2d 72 (1981). 
Id. at 234. 
Defendant did not present any evidence and the only 
version of his encounter with Mr. Sargent in the Sargent 
apartment came from the victim. Based on tfte testimony given by 
Mr. and Mrs. Sargent, a reasonable jury could infer that 
defendant had the requisite intent for a burglary conviction. 
This Court has often reiterated the proposition that a person's 
0 
intent must be inferred from surrounding circumstances. 
Specific intent, need not be proved by 
direct evidence, and, of course, is always 
subject to denial by an accused. The fact-
finder , however, is entitled to draw all 
reasonable inferences from the facts and from 
the actions of the defendant. As this Court 
stated in State v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 
453 P.2d 696 (1969): 
With respect to the intent: It 
is true that the State was unable 
to prove directly what was in the 
defendant's mind relative to doing 
harm to the victim; and that he in 
fact denied any such intent. How-
ever, his version does not estab-
lish the fact nor does it even 
necessarily raise sufficient doubt 
to vitiate the conviction. If it 
were so, it would lie within the 
power of a defendant to defeat 
practically any conviction whiqn 
depended upon his state of mine}. 
[453 P.2d at 69] 
State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979) • 
There were sufficient facts given at trial to support 
the element that defendant entered the apartment with the intent 
to commit a theft. The door had been locked when the Sargents 
left at 1:00 p.m. (R. 94 at 20 and 46-47) but was ajar when Mr. 
Sargent returned. The door was not wide open as when someone 
enters looking to see if someone they know is there, but open 
only one inch as if to conceal the fact that someone had entered 
(R. 94 at 22). Defendant was not near the outside door as if he 
had just entered and was calling out to see if anyone was home 
but was across the living room near the bedroom entrance as if 
just coming out of the bedroom (R. 94 at 23). 
Nothing had yet been taken which could mean that the 
burglary had just begun and that there was little of value to 
ta)cfe (R. 94 at 25-28). The defendant's first words to Mr. 
Sargent were that it was a big mistake and that he hadn't taken 
anything (R. 94 at 23). The jury might have found that that was 
a curious statement for defendant to make at that point. 
While nothing had been taken, a jewelry box had been 
disturbed as if defendant were looking in it to find something of 
value (R. 94 at 26). Mr. Sargent noticed this because it was 
"strange" that the box was open (R. 94 at 26). Mrs. Sargent 
testified that while she had not specifically checked the box 
before leaving, she hadn't opened it in about a year and that it 
had a thick coat of dust on it (R. 94 at 48). She noticed what 
she thought were fingerprints in the dust (R. 94 at 49) which her 
husband could not have left that day because the box was already 
open when he noticed it (R. 94 at 26). 
Defendant makes much of the fact that when defendant 
partially pulled out his pockets, Mr. Sargent didn't see any of 
the Sargents' property or any burglary tools. Mr. Sargent 
testified that he didn't check all of defendant's pockets (R. 94 
at 36-37 and 44) and so Mr. Sargent was not able to say that the 
defendant didn't have any burglary tools or credit card with 
which to pick a lock. 
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Defendant's conciliatory manner 4nd his statement when 
confronted by Mr. Sargent are indicative of one who had been 
caught in the act of burglary but had not yet had a chance to 
take or conceal anything. He wanted to placate Mr. Sargent and 
try to talk his way out. He knew that he had not yet taken 
anything so his best course was to brazen it out and hope that 
Mr. Sargent would be confused and let him go. This is exactly 
what happened. He had allayed Mr. Sargent's suspicions long 
enough to make his get-away but not enough to keep Mr. Sargent 
from having second thoughts. 
From all of these circumstances surrounding the 
occurrence, a reasonable jury could infer that defendant intended 
to steal but had been caught in the act. All defendant's story 
to Mr. Sargent about a Steve Goddard, for whom he was looking, 
could be seen for what it was—a ruse to confuse Mr. Sargent. 
Since there is "some evidence, including reasonable inferences, 
from which findings of all requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made," Booker, supra at 345, this Court must 
affirm the jury's verdict. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT MENTIONED TWO COUNTS IN THE 
INFORMATION BUT ONLY READ ONE TO THE JURY. 
During voir dire the trial court made the following 
statement: 
THE COURT: This case is entitled State of 
Utah, plaintiff vs. Alfred William Johnson, 
Jr., defendant. Am I correct? That the 
trial as to both counts, am I not^ 
_ 0 -
(R. 94 at 9). The prosecutor immediately asked to approach the 
bench and a discussion was held off the record. Then the court 
proceeded: 
THE COURT: There is one count entitled 
"burglary . . . 
(R. 94 at 10). No further mention of another count was made and 
voir dire continued and a jury was selected. A recess was taken, 
opening statements given and the noon recess taken. On return 
from the noon recess and before the jury was brought in, 
defendant moved for a mistrial based on the trial court's mention 
of a second count (R. 94 at 14). The prosecutor argued that the 
court had not revealed the nature of the second charge so there 
were no grounds for mistrial. The court agreed that no harm had 
been done but offered to make* a curative statement to the jury. 
Defendant declined, feeling that a corrective statement would 
"only further complicate the matter" (R. 94 at 15-16). Thus, 
defendant did not allow the trial court to cure any possible 
error but seeks to try to correct on appeal. Since defendant did 
not allow the trial court to correct any alleged error it is 
specious for him to now appeal that issue. See State v. Hales, 
652 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1982). 
The court's inadvertent statement mentioning two counts 
did not prejudice defendant. The matter was not belabored which 
might have fixed it in the jurors' minds. There is no showing in 
the record that the jury was influenced by the statement. See 
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984). During their 
deliberations the jury sent out two notes containing questions 
but neither involved questions about another charge (R. 64). 
There is no reason to believe that the brief mention of a second 
charge swayed the jury in any way. 
In a similar situation in Nevada that Supreme Court 
affirmed a defendant's conviction. That case was more egregious 
than the present one because a portion of the habitual criminal 
chajrge was actually read to the jury. 
Finally, appellant contends we must 
reverse his conviction because a small 
portion of the habitual criminal charge 
contained in the information was 
inadvertently read to the jury by the 
district court clerk, contrary to the mandate 
of NRS 207.010(5). Here, the appellant 
exercised his 5th Amendment right and elected 
not to be a witness in his own behalf. Any 
material error with respect to the reading of 
the criminal charge would militate against a 
defendant's right to silence. The statute 
precludes any reference to the habitual 
charge during the trial of the primary 
offense. A review of the prior offenses 
makes it clear why appellant may have 
determined not to take the stand. The 
statute speaks in terms of "charge," and 
although there was reference to "habitual 
criminal" made by the court clerk, none of 
the convictions were alluded to. Had they 
been, prejudicial error may have occurred. 
Jones v. States, 564 P.2d 605, 607 (Nev. 1977) (footnote 
omitted). 
This Court has maintained that: 
We are firmly committed to the proposition 
that the rules of law and procedure must be 
adhered to, particularly in a criminal case. 
But once a fair trial has been afforded the 
defendant and a verdict which is supported by 
the evidence rendered, the proceedings are 
presumed to be valid; and we are not disposed 
to reverse for mere technicalities or 
irregularities unless they put the defendant 
at some substantial disadvantage or had some 
material bearing on the fairness of the 
proceedings or its outcome. 
State v. Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1967) (footnote omitted). 
Since no mention was made of the substance of the 
second charge (indeed, the fact of a second count was barely 
mentioned), the defendant's right to a fair trial was not 
prejudiced. This Court should not overturn the conviction on a 
mere technicality. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SENTENCED DEFENDANT 
TO AN ENHANCED SENTENCE FOLLOWING HIS 
CONVICTION ON THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL CHARGE. 
On January 15, 1988, defendant was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison for the burglary charge and an indeterminate term of five 
years to life for the habitual criminal charge (R« 94 at 108). 
The court ordered that the sentences run consecutively saying 
"with the record that this individual has, I don't think he has 
earned any kind of consideration in not running the sentence 
consecutively." (R. 94 at 107.) Defendant raised no objection 
to the sentence at that time but now challenges it on appeal. 
Utah habitual criminal statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
10001 (1978) states: 
Any person who has been twice convicted, 
sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at 
least a felony of the second degree or a 
crime which, if committed within this state 
would have been a capital felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of second degree, 
and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second 
degree committed in this state, other than 
murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life. 
Defendant claims that sentencing him to a "separate and 
consecutive sentence" violates the statutory provisions of the 
habitual criminal statute and the protection against double 
jeopardy (Br. of App. 14). Defendant, relying on State v. 
Bailey, 712 P.2d 281 (Utah 1985) and cases from the jurisdictions 
of Colorado and Idaho, claims that his sentence was not enhanced 
by the consecutive term of five years to life, but was, rather, a 
separate consecutive sentence for being an habitual criminal in 
violation of double jeopardy protections. 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld 
habitual criminal statutes when assailed on double jeopardy 
grounds. In Gryqer v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948), the 
Supreme Court stated that the adjudication ^s an habitual 
offender "is not to be viewed as either new jeopardy or 
additional penalty for the earlier crimes. It is a stiffened 
penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an 
aggravated offense because a repetitive one," See also Spencer 
v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559 (1967). This Court has also 
consistently upheld the constitutionality of the habitual 
criminal statute, both under the previous ai^ d current statutory 
provisions. State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1978); Thompson 
v. Harris, 107 Utah 99, 152 P.2d 91 (Utah 1944). The Utah 
statute has been upheld when assailed specifically on double 
jeopardy grounds. State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 
1985). 
This Court currently has before it two cases in which 
the same question was raised, State v. Stilling, Case No. 870094 
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(Utah filed April 7, 1988) and State v. Williams, Case No. 
870095, (Utah filed June 6, 1988). In the Stillinqs case, 
defendant is asking that his sentence of five years to life for 
Aggravated Robbery be replac€»d by a similar term for an Habitual 
Criminal conviction which was ordered to run concurrently. To do 
so would be to negate to a C€»rtain extent the enhancement 
provisions of the Habitual Criminal statute. Replacing a five 
years to life sentence with another five years to life term does 
not enhance the sentence for the persistent offender. 
In the present case, the triggering offense is a second 
degree felony which mandates a sentence of one to fifteen years. 
To replace the sentence for the Burglary which triggered the 
Habitual Criminal charge with the term required by the Habitual 
Criminal statute would increase the incarceration in this case. 
On the other hand, it would also trigger a claim of 
disproportionate sentences. The defendant in a case similar to 
Stillinqs, who has the sentence for his triggering offense 
replaced by the sentence for Habitual Criminal, does not receive 
a longer indeterminate sentence. But if, as in the present case, 
the triggering offense is less than a first degree felony, the 
sentence for the triggering offense is replaced by a longer 
indeterminate sentence. This defendant's punishment is enhanced 
by the trial court's order but the sentence of one convicted of 
an underlying first degree felony is not enhanced in the same 
fashion. 
The sentence imposed on defendant was in compliance 
with the statutory provision and the purpose underlying the 
statute. MThe habitual criminal statute does not create a new 
1 A _ 
crime; it merely enhances the punishment for the conviction of a 
crime committed when the defendant has theretofore committed at 
least two other felonies and been committed to prison therefor." 
State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah .^978) (emphasis 
added). The purpose underlying the habitual criminal statute was 
further defined in State v. Montague, 671 P.2d 187, 190 (Utah 
1983) when this Court stated that the purpobe is to "make 
persistent offenders subject to greater sanctions." 
The habitual criminal statute does not state that the 
prescribed period of imprisonment of five y£ars to life replaces 
the sentence for the present conviction. Nor does it expressly 
tack on a specific indeterminate term of years to run 
consecutively as does, for example, the firearms enhancement 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (197$). The statute 
merely states that once the elements of the charge have been 
established, the defendant shall "be determined as a habitual 
criminal and be imprisoned in the state prison for from five 
years to life." Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-1001 (1978). 
The typical double jeopardy argument is similar to the 
argument raised in State v. Bailey, 712 P.2<(i 281 (Utah 1985), 
that is, that the habitual criminal provision violates 
prohibitions against double jeopardy because the defendant is 
receiving double punishment for earlier convictions. Courts have 
universally rejected this argument because, instead of twice 
punishing a defendant for an offense, the habitual criminal 
provision enhances the punishment for the current offense. Moore 
v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676-77 (1895) (increased severity of 
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punishment for present offense is not second punishment for 
previous offense); Gryger v. Burke 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948) 
(sentence as habitual criminal is not additional penalty for 
earlier crimes, but stiffened penalty for latest crime which is 
considered to be aggravated because it was repetitive); Zeimer v. 
Turner, 14 Utah 2d 232, 381 P.2d 721, 723 (Utah 1963). In 
Bailey, a case in which the defendant was convicted on a habitual 
criminal charge and sentenced to an indeterminate term of five 
years to life for that conviction, this Court rejected the double 
jeopardy claim and stated that "the defendant properly received 
an enhanced sentence for his latest conviction." 712 P.2d at 
287. 
Under this reasoning, it is of no consequence how the 
enhanced penalty is procedurally imposed, e.g., addition of a 
specific term of years, a specific minimum mandatory term (as in 
the 15 year minimum imposed under the previous Utah statute), 
substitution of a greater sentence for a lower one, or, as done 
under the current statutory scheme, tacking on an additional 
indeterminate term of five years to life, regardless of whether 
it runs concurrently or consecutively. The purpose and effect 
remains to enhance the punishment for the latest criminal 
conviction, not to punish for the second time a prior criminal 
act/ and not to separately sentence for the criminal act of being 
an habitual criminal. In the present case, the added term of 
five years to life as enhancement for the present convictions 
does not violate provisions against double jeopardy. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, and any information which may 
be brought out on oral argument, the State asks this Court to 
uphold the jury's verdict and the sentencing imposed in this 
case. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ,^5~ w day of September, 
1988. 
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